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Abstract. A general technique of batch verification for equality of discrete logarithms is proposed.
Examples of batching threshold decryption schemes are presented based on threshold versions of three
popular cryptosystems - ElGamal, RSA and Paillier. Our technique offers large computational savings
when employed in schemes with a large number of ciphertexts to be decrypted, such as in e-voting
or e-auction schemes using threshold decryption. The resulting effect is beneficial for producing more
efficient schemes.
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1 Introduction
Threshold decryption [16, 20, 12] is essential in fault-tolerant schemes, whether it is e-commerce
(e.g: e-auction) or e-government (e.g: e-voting). In a threshold decryption protocol, the public
(encryption) key is published, while the corresponding private (decryption) key is shared among n
participants. A threshold t < n is set, such that more than t participants are required to cooperate
to decrypt a ciphertext while the cooperation of no more than t participants will find no information
about the decryption key. In e-auction, these participants are auctioneers sharing the power to open
the bids. In e-voting, the participants are counting authorities sharing the power to tally the votes.
To ensure correctness, it is necessary to guarantee that the shared decryption is performed
correctly through some public verification functions, without revealing the encrypted message, the
private key, and its shares. In many popular cryptosystems, the verification process is implemented
by using zero-knowledge proof of equality of discrete logarithms (PEQDL) [6].
However, applications such as those mentioned in the previous paragraph process many cipher-
texts. Thus, they require many instances of such proofs. This lead to costly verification computations
which can further develop into a bottleneck.
1.1 Performance Issue
Consider a secure e-auction [1, 18] or e-voting scheme [2, 4, 8, 12], where the submitted bids or
ballots are required to be anonymous. After the encrypted bids or ballots are made anonymous
through the use of an anonymous channel (e.g: mix network), they are decrypted by the decryption
⋆ This is the full paper containing details of batching correct decryption shares for Paillier cryptosystem. The
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2authorities. Each decryption share requires a proof of correct decryption. The proof is required to
verify and identify correct decryption shares to reconstruct the original bid or vote. Verification
of many instances of such proofs leads to costly computation which can further develop into a
bottleneck affecting the performance of the scheme.
Batching is a useful technique to decrease computational cost in processing the proofs of correct
decryption together. Bellare et al. [3] proposed three batch verification techniques - RS (random
subset) test, SE (small exponent) test, and Bucket test. However, their scheme is not applicable
to our threshold decryptions verification problem for two reasons. Firstly, their techniques batch
the verification of common base exponentiations, not the verification of PEQDLs (i.e: common
exponent). Secondly, Boyd and Pavlovski [5] demonstrated that although the theorems in [3] are
correct, their application in the paper is inappropriate since the assumptions on the group structure
are not strong enough. Hoshino et al. [13] later fixed and extended Bellare’s work to batch verify
exponentiations in multiple bases. However, this is also irrelevant to our problem of batch verifying
PEQDLs with a common exponent.
1.2 Main Contributions
The following summarises our main contribution presented in the paper:
1. We fix the problem presented by Boyd and Pavlovski in SE test, and also extend the test to
batch verify PEQDLs.
2. We present and formally prove theorems on the extended test.
3. We present applications of the theorems to verify valid decryption shares in threshold versions
of three popular cryptosystems - threshold ElGamal, threshold RSA, and threshold Paillier.
Our result improves computational efficiency of verifying valid decryption shares in threshold de-
cryption. As threshold decryption is fundamental in various applications (e.g: e-auction, e-voting,
e-cash) to provide robustness, our result offers improvement in efficiency, performance and practi-
cality when integrated with many schemes.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers an introduction to threshold
decryption. Section 3 presents two theorems and their corresponding proofs essential to our result.
In section 4, the theorems are applied to threshold versions of the three popular cryptosystems.
Sections 5 and 6 analyse the security and efficiency of our applied batch verification. Section 7 is a
conclusion.
2 Background
In this section we recall decryption of a single ciphertext in threshold decryption schemes for
simplicity. Note that many schemes require decryption of many ciphertexts in threshold decryption.
2.1 Threshold Decryption
In a threshold decryption scheme, a secret s is encrypted using some public-key encryption algo-
rithm as c = E(s). The private decryption key d is shared by using Shamir’s (t, n) secret sharing
scheme [19] among n participants (decrypting authorities) Pi, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Each Pi holds a
di, a share of d. The ciphertext c is partially decrypted by each Pi as zi = Ddi(c), and later recon-
structed using the decryption shares from the set S containing at least t+1 honest participants by
Lagrange interpolation.
3A verification function V (c, zi, vi) is used to determine honest participants. Normally the veri-
fication key vi of participant Pi contains a commitment to di.
Threshold decryption is often employed in many crypto-based applications. The three most
commonly used are threshold versions of ElGamal, RSA, and Paillier algorithms. E-auction and
e-voting schemes employing them include [12, 2, 4, 8, 1, 18].
2.2 Threshold ElGamal
Pedersen [16] presented a threshold ElGamal signature scheme. It is straight-forward to adjust the
scheme into a threshold decryption protocol. We recall the protocol as follows:
1. Key generation and sharing:
Randomly select a large prime q, such that p = 2q + 1 is also a prime. G is a cyclic subgroup
in Z∗p of order q with a generator g. The private decryption key is d ∈ Zq, while g and e = g
d is
the public encryption key. Using Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, let f(x) =
∑t
r=0 arx
r, where
a0 = d, and the rest of ar are random values. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, distribute the secret share
di = f(i) to n participants {Pi}, and each Pi computes the verification key vi = g
di . The
parameters p, q, g, e and vi are made public, while d and di are kept secret for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
2. Encryption:
Select a random r ∈ Zq and encrypt a secret message s ∈ Z
∗
p as a pair (α, β), where α = g
r and
β = ser.
3. Shared decryption:
Each participant Pi computes the decryption share zi = α
di and proves the knowledge of the
secret share di using non-interactive zero-knowledge that:
logg(vi) = logα(zi) (1)
Since q is public, g and α can be publicly verified to be generators of G.
4. Shares combining:
Correct decryption share zi of Pi is verified as Pi proves the knowledge of di shown in the
previous step. S is the set of more than t+1 participants providing correct shares. The original
message is reconstructed by computing s = β∏
i∈S z
µi
i
, where µi =
∏
i′∈S,i′ 6=i
i′
i′−i
.
2.3 Threshold RSA
Shoup [20] presented a threshold version of RSA signature scheme, which can be adjusted to a
threshold decryption scheme as shown by Fouque et al. [12]. We recall the scheme as follows:
1. Key generation and sharing:
Randomly select primes p′ and q′, such that p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ + 1 are strong primes. Set
N = pq and M = p′q′. Select a prime e > n and compute d, such that ed = 1 mod N . The
public encryption key is PK = (N, e), while d is the private decryption key. Using Shamir’s
secret sharing scheme, let f(x) =
∑t
r=0 arx
r modM , where a0 = d and random values for
rest of ar ∈ {0, . . . , N ∗M − 1}. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, distribute the secret share di = f(i) to n
participants Pi. Randomly select a verification base v in the cyclic group of squares in Z
∗
N . Each
participant Pi then computes the verification key vi = v
di mod N . The parameters N, e, v and
vi are made public, while M,p, q, p
′, q′, d and di are kept secret, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
2. Encryption:
Encrypt a secret message s as c = se mod N .
43. Shared decryption:
Each participant Pi computes the decryption share zi = c
2∆di , where ∆ = n! and proves the
knowledge of the secret share di using non-interactive zero-knowledge that:
logv(vi) = logc4∆(z
2
i ) (2)
Notice that as v and c4∆ are squares, Shoup argues that they are of order M with a large
probability (accurately: 1− p
′+q′−1
pq
). Thus, the proof is assumed to be PEQDL in a group with
a known order.
4. Shares combining:
Correct decryption share zi of Pi is verified as Pi proves the knowledge of di shown in the previous
step. S is the set of more than t+1 participants providing correct shares. The original message is
obtained by first calculating s4∆
2
=
∏
i∈S z
2∆µi
i mod N , where µi =
∏
i′∈S,i′ 6=i
i′
i′−i
. Since e > n
is relatively prime to 4∆2, extended Euclidean algorithm can be applied to obtain a and b, such
that a× 4∆2 + b× e = 1. Therefore, s is reconstructed as s = sa4∆
2
sbe = (s4∆
2
)acb mod N .
As in the original scheme [20, 12], parameters in the key generation and sharing stage are
generated by a trusted dealer. The random verification base v is trusted to be in the cyclic subgroup
of squares in Z∗N . Therefore, v and vi are squares in the group of Z
∗
N2
. As a result, when verification
of Equation 2 is performed to check the validity of the decryption share, it is guaranteed to be
PEQDL in the same cyclic group with a large probability.
2.4 Threshold Paillier
Based on Shoup’s threshold version of RSA signature, Fouque et al. proposed a threshold version of
Paillier cryptosystem [14] in the context of voting or lotteries [12]. The scheme was later improved
by Damg˚ard and Jurik [10] oriented toward a homomorphic e-voting scheme. More details of the
algorithm are provided in Appendix B.
3 Batch Verification for Equality of Logarithms
In many cryptographic applications as mentioned in the previous sections, normally there are
many ciphertexts (cj) to be processed in threshold decryption. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
For m encrypted messages to be decrypted by n authorities, one requires m × n instances of
PEQDL verifications of decryption share zi,j (participant i’s decryption share from ciphertext cj).
Verification of correct shared decryption for every share zi,j is the greatest factor contributing to
computational cost in a threshold decryption scheme.
Techniques presented in [3], [5] and [13] only address batch verification for modular exponen-
tiation. However, tests in [3] can be modified and extended to batch verify PEQDL. Hence, the
efficiency of the threshold decryption scheme, as discussed in the previous paragraph, can be greatly
improved.
This section presents two theorems on the modified SE test to batch verify PEQDL, i.e: verifying
common exponent. Batching verification of common base is also briefly discussed. In Section 4, the
theorems are used as a foundation to the applications proposed.
RS test randomly selects subsets of the instances to be verified in avoiding “bad pairs”. This test
is not sufficiently efficient, and thus is not discussed in this paper. SE test introduces random small
exponents on the instances, such that an attacker needs to guess the random values to produce
an accepted incorrect batch. This test is more suitable for our purpose and we modify this test
5P1 P2 Pi Pn
c1 −→ z1,1 z2,1 · · · zi,1 · · · zn,1 −→ s1
c2 −→ z1,2 z2,2 · · · zi,2 · · · zn,2 −→ s2
...
...
...
...
...
...
cj −→ z1,j z2,j · · · zi,j · · · zn,j −→ sj
...
...
...
...
...
...
cm −→ z1,m z2,m · · · zi,m · · · zn,m −→ sm
Fig. 1. Threshold decryption of n participants {Pi}, m ciphertexts {cj}, mn decryption shares {zi,j}, recovering m
secret messages {sj}
on batch verification for PEQDL. Bucket test forms groups of the instances to be batched, and
performs random SE tests on them. Our SE test can be extended naturally to Bucket test for batch
verifying PEQDL. However, the extension of SE test to Bucket test for batch verifying PEQDL is
omitted for simplicity. In the theorems below, we batch the verification of j instances of PEQDL
on one participant (i = 1), and omit the subscript i.
3.1 Batching PEQDL Within The Same Cyclic Group
Theorem 1 provides the foundation for batching PEQDL within the same cyclic group.
Theorem 1. For j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, G is a cyclic group with q as the smallest factor of ord(G),
generators g and cj , and a security parameter l, where 2
l < q. The small exponents tj are random
l-bit strings, and y, zj ∈ G. If ∃k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} ∧ logg y 6= logck zk, then logg y 6= log∏m
j=1 c
tj
j
∏m
j=1 z
tj
j
with a probability (taken over choice of tj) of no less than 1− 2
−l.
To prove Theorem 1, we first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1. If ∃k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} ∧ logg y 6= logckzk, given a definite set S = {tj |tj < 2
l ∧ j ∈
{1, . . . , k−1, k+1, . . . ,m}}, then there is only at most one tk satisfying logg y = log∏m
j=1 c
tj
j
∏m
j=1 z
tj
j ,
where j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Proof (Lemma 1). If the lemma is incorrect, the following two equations are satisfied simultaneously
where logg y 6= logck zk and tk 6= t
′
k.
logg y = log∏m
j=1 c
tj
j
m∏
j=1
z
tj
j
logg y = log
(
∏k−1
j=1 c
tj
j )(c
t′
k
k
)(
∏m
j=k+1 c
tj
j )
(
k−1∏
j=1
z
tj
j )(z
t′k
k )(
m∏
j=k+1
z
tj
j )
Suppose y = gx, we re-write the two previous equations as:
(
m∏
j=1
c
tj
j )
x =
m∏
j=1
z
tj
j
((
k−1∏
j=1
c
tj
j )(c
t′k
k )(
m∏
j=k+1
c
tj
j ))
x = (
k−1∏
j=1
z
tj
j )(z
t′k
k )(
m∏
j=k+1
z
tj
j )
6Without losing generality, suppose t′k > tk, we can simplify the previous two equations to be
c
x(t′
k
−tk)
k = z
t′
k
−tk
k , or (
cxk
zk
)t
′
k−tk = 1. As
cxk
zk
∈ G, t′k − tk is a factor of ord(G) if
cxk
zk
6= 1. Since
0 < t′k − tk < q, therefore,
cxk
zk
= 1 or cxk = zk. This is contradictory to the assumption of logg y 6=
logck zk. ⊓⊔
Proof (Theorem 1). Lemma 1 means that among the (2l)m possible combinations of tj for j ∈
{1, . . . ,m}, at most (2l)m−1 of them can satisfy logg y = log∏m
j=1 c
tj
j
∏m
j=1 z
tj
j when logg y 6= logcj zj .
Therefore, given a random tj for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if logg y 6= logcj zj , then logg y = log∏m
j=1 c
tj
j
∏m
j=1 z
tj
j
is accepted with a probability of no more than 2−l. ⊓⊔
3.2 Batching PEQDL In Different Cyclic Subgroup of Z∗
p
In Theorem 1, there is a condition that g, y, cj , zj ∈ G for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. However, in some
applications there is uncertainty of satisfaction on this condition, and additional computation is
often required to verify the condition. This is a problem ignored by Bellare et al. [3]. In reality, this
extra computation is too expensive so that in many cases it prevents the applicability of Theorem 1.
To overcome this problem, Theorem 2 is proposed. This theorem does not require the pre-
condition that the LHS and RHS of the batching equation be in the same cyclic subgroup of Z∗p.
Theorem 2. Suppose p and q are large primes, such that p = 2q + 1. G, of order q and generator
g, is a cyclic multiplicative subgroup in Z∗p. For j = 1, . . . ,m and x ∈R Z
∗
q, y = g
x, zj ∈ Z
∗
p,
l is a security parameter satisfying 2l < q and tj ∈R {1, . . . , 2
l}. If ∃k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} ∧ logg y 6=
logck ±zk mod p, then logg y 6= log∏m
j=1 c
tj
j
∏m
j=1 z
tj
j with a probability of no less than 1− 2
−l.
Due to similarity of Theorem 2 and Theorem 1, we defer the proof for Theorem 2 to Appendix A.
3.3 Screening
For m ciphertexts processed in threshold decryption, the previous two theorems are suited to batch
each verification of valid decryption shares produced by one participant Pi. Thus, if the batch
verification fails, we can identify that particular participant to be dishonest. This is examined in
detail in Section 4 and Section 5.
In this subsection, we briefly explain another type of batch verifying valid decryption shares
using a common base (same ciphertexts, different participants). If there is only one message in the
threshold decryption process (m = 1), we can slightly modify the two theorems above to verify
valid decryption shares produced by all the participants {Pi} together as:
logg(
n∏
i=1
ytii )
?
= logc(
n∏
i=1
ztii )
We call this technique ‘screening’ because it can only detect invalid decryption share(s), but is
unable to identify the dishonest participant(s). However, divide and conquer, cut and choose, or
binary search method [15] can be applied for identifying the bad decryption share(s), thus identifying
the dishonest participant(s). Note that this technique only offers considerable performance increase
if used in identifying dishonest participants in a large group (i.e: n is large).
74 Applications in Threshold Decryption
In this section, we present the application of our batching theorems (Section 3) to batch verify
threshold versions of three popular cryptosystems - threshold ElGamal, RSA, and Paillier. We
apply Theorem 2 to batch verify threshold ElGamal, and Theorem 1 to batch verify threshold RSA
and threshold Paillier. The protocols presented in this section are based on Chaum-Pedersen [6]
with a slight modification where the verifier randomly selects the small exponents on the first step.
4.1 Batch Verification in ElGamal
Theorem 2 is suitable to batch verify threshold ElGamal as:
1. For threshold version of ElGamal, the group G is the subgroup of Z∗p with an order q.
2. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, vi ∈ Z
∗
p and zi,j ∈ Z
∗
p can easily be checked by testing
whether 0 < vi, zi,j < p.
3. The values g ∈ G and αj ∈ G are publicly verifiable by testing
(
g
p
)
= 1 and
(
αj
p
)
= 1 (using
the Legendre symbol as in [13]). This proves g and αj to be generators of G, if g 6= 1.
4. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, ti,j can be chosen randomly while still satisfying ti,j <
2l < q.
According to Theorem 2, verification of PEQDL in threshold ElGamal (Equation 1) can be
batched using SE test as:
logg(vi) = log∏m
j=1 α
ti,j
j
(
m∏
j=1
z
ti,j
i,j ) (3)
To verify: logg(vi) = logαj (zi,j), for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Pi Verifier
ti,j ∈R {1, . . . , 2
l}
ti,j
←−−−−−−−
ri ∈R Zq
γi,1 = g
ri mod p
γi,2 = (
∏m
j=1 α
ti,j
j )
ri mod p
γi,1,γi,2
−−−−−−−→
ui ∈R Zq
ui
←−−−−−−−
wi = ri − uidi mod q
wi
−−−−−−−→
γi,1 = g
wiv
ui
i mod p
γi,2 = (
∏m
j=1 α
ti,j
j )
wi
(
∏m
j=1(zi,j)
ti,j )ui mod p
Fig. 2. Batch verification of valid decryption shares for threshold version of ElGamal cryptosystem.
Interactive batch verification protocol for threshold version of ElGamal is shown in Figure 2.
Using a hash function and employing the well-known Fiat-Shamir heuristic [11], the protocol can
8be made non-interactive by producing the challenge ui using a collision-resistant hash function H,
where H : (0, 1)∗ → Zq and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, as follows:
ui = H(γi,1, γi,2, g, vi, αj , zi,j)
Producing the small exponents non-interactively requires a different scenario further explained
in Section 5.2. We slightly extend the coin-flipping protocol for the participants to provide a shared
source of randomness. This is required in order to prevent a prover from cheating by trying multiple
zi,j values until a suitable ti,j value is found. The random values provided are then used to compute
the small exponents using a collision-resistant hash function. These are conducted during the shared
decryption stage. The protocol to produce the small exponents is shown in Figure 3 and is detailed
as below.
1. Each participant (prover) Pi selects a random value τi, commits to it using a suitable commit-
ment function, e.g: a hash function as H(τi), and publishes the commitment.
2. Each participant Pi then produces and publishes their decryption share as zi,j = α
di
j .
3. The random value τi selected in the first step is then revealed by publishing it.
4. The random small exponents are then calculated using a collision-resistant hash function as:
tj = H(τi, αj , j), where i = {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
P1 P2 · · · Pn
↓ ↓ ↓
H(τ1) H(τ2) · · · H(τn)
↓ ↓ ↓
z1,j z2,j · · · zn,j
↓ ↓ ↓
t1 t2 · · · tn
tj = H(τ1, τ2, . . . , τn, αj , j) mod 2
l
Fig. 3. Producing the small exponents non-interactively
Note that the use of digital signature on the published values is required to authenticate them.
Non-interactively, each prover uses the same small exponents tj as opposed to using different ti,j
values provided by the verifier for each prover in the interactive version.
The prover then publishes (γi,1, γi,2, wi) for public verification. The verification process can be
conducted publicly by calculating the small exponents and challenge as above, and checking:
γi,1 = g
wivuii mod p
γi,2 = (
m∏
j=1
(αtj )wi(
m∏
j=1
(zi,j)
tj )ui mod p
If all these are satisfied, the verification is accepted. Otherwise, it fails.
We are only convinced that if there exists k where 1 ≤ k ≤ m and logg(v
2
i ) = logαj (z
2
i,j),
the batch verification can only be passed with negligible probability. Namely, unless zi,j = ±α
di
j ,
the batch verification will always fail. Thus, our batch verification result is not yet satisfactory as
sj = −α
di
j may also satisfy our batch verification. This will lead to incorrect decryption. To fix
9this, the decryption requires one extra step, i.e: multiplying sj with (−1) when sj /∈ G. After sj
is recovered through the threshold decryption procedure, we test if
(
sj
p
)
= 1 (using the Legendre
symbol). If it is accepted, sj ∈ G. Otherwise, sj = −sj mod p. Then the original secret message is
recovered as
βj
sj
mod p. The additional cost is only one exponentiation.
4.2 Batch Verification in RSA
To verify: logv(vi) = logc4∆
j
(z2i,j), for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Pi Verifier
ti,j ∈R {1, . . . , 2
l}
ti,j
←−−−−−−−
ri ∈R ZN
γi,1 = v
ri mod N
γi,2 = (
∏m
j=1(c
4∆
j )
ti,j )ri mod N
γi,1,γi,2
−−−−−−−→
ui ∈R [0, A)
ui
←−−−−−−−
wi = ri − uidi
wi
−−−−−−−→
γi,1 = v
wiv
ui
i mod N
γi,2 = (
∏m
j=1(c
4∆
j )
ti,j )wi
(
∏m
j=1(z
2
i,j)
ti,j )ui mod N
Fig. 4. Batch verification of valid decryption shares for threshold version of RSA cryptosystem.
Theorem 1 is applicable to batch the verification of RSA threshold decryption shares as:
1. For threshold version of RSA cryptosystem, G is the cyclic group containing all the squares in
Z
∗
N with order M = p
′q′, the smallest factor of which is min(p′, q′).
2. The value v is trusted to be a generator of squares in Z∗N . As vi is produced using v, and z
2
i,j
are squares that can be generated by the verifier, thus vi, z
2
i,j ∈ G (cyclic subgroup of squares
in Z∗N ).
3. The value of c4∆j is a square, and v is trusted to be squares in Z
∗
N chosen by the trusted dealer.
Therefore, both c4∆j , v ∈ G. Thus, c
4∆
j and v are generators of G (see [20]) with a very large
probability (1− p
′+q′−1
p′q′
).
4. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, ti,j can be chosen randomly while still satisfying ti,j <
2l < min(p′, q′).
According to Theorem 1, SE test can be implemented as the following:
logv(vi) = log∏m
j=1(c
4∆
j )
ti,j (
m∏
j=1
(z2i,j)
ti,j ) (4)
Interactive batch verification for threshold version of RSA is shown in Figure 4. Where A ×
ord(G) is much smaller than N , the challenge ui must be chosen in [0, A) such that the shared
10
secret key di is statistically hidden in the response wi as in [17, 2]. Analysis in [17] suggests the
minimum size of the challenge |A| to be 80 bits, and 128 bits for more secure applications.
Using a hash function and employing the well-known Fiat-Shamir heuristic, the protocol is made
non-interactive similar to the previous section. The prover produces the small exponents as shown
in the previous section (Figure 3), and produces the challenge ui using a collision-resistant hash
function H, where H : (0, 1)∗ 7→ ZM and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, similar to the previous section as follows:
tj = H(t1, t2, . . . , tn, αj , j) mod 2
l
ui = H(γi,1, γi,2, v, vi, c
4∆
j , z
2
i,j)
The prover then publishes (γi,1, γi,2, wi) for public verification. The verification process can be
conducted publicly by calculating the small exponents and challenge as above, and checking:
γi,1 = v
wivuii mod N
γi,2 = (
m∏
j=1
(c4∆j )
tj )wi(
m∏
j=1
(z2i,j)
tj )ui mod N
If all these are satisfied, the verification is accepted. Otherwise, it fails.
Unlike in threshold ElGamal, extra verification to ensure that decryption shares passing the
batch verification are not −zi,j is not necessary. This is because decryption shares zi,j are explicitly
squared in the share combining phase to reconstruct the secret message.
4.3 Batch Verification in Paillier
Theorem 1 is suitable to batch verify threshold Paillier. Interactive and non-interactive batch ver-
ification for threshold version of Paillier is similar to that of threshold version of RSA. Due to
similarity to that of threshold version of RSA, we provide more details in Appendix C.
5 Security Analysis
5.1 Completeness
Completeness of each of the three protocols in Section 4 is straight-forward. This is because if the
batch verification equations in the three protocols are correct, they output positive results.
5.2 Soundness
The three protocols in Section 4 are very similar. They are based on Chaum-Pedersen’s protocol.
We slightly modify the protocol where the verifier randomly selects the small exponents at the
beginning of the protocol run. The proof of soundness for the protocols follows from Chaum-
Pedersen’s scheme as they are essentially the same. The small exponents ti,j are chosen randomly
in a very similar manner (ti,j < 2
l) to choosing the random challenge.
Given the same random small exponents and commitments, no matter which challenge is chosen,
the prover reveals no other information than the fact that the discrete logarithms of the verification
key to the base of verification base equals the discrete logarithms of the product of the decryption
shares to the base of the product of the ciphertexts (Equation 3, 4, and 6).
In the interactive version, the probability for a prover to cheat is negligible. It is not feasible to
forge the decryption shares where the verification is accepted without the knowledge of the share
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decryption key. Also, where the prover indeed holds the decryption key share, the probability of
producing bad decryption shares where the verification is accepted is also negligible. This is because
the small exponents and challenge are chosen randomly by the verifier. For example, in batching
the verification of correct ElGamal decryption shares, the probability of a prover guessing a correct
random small exponent and challenge, and the verification is accepted is 2−lq−1.
In the non-interactive version, we also follow Chaum-Pedersen’s protocol with a slight addition
in choosing the random small exponents (Figure 3) based on the coin-flipping protocol. We avoid
the use of a hash function with the input (the decryption share zi,j) chosen by a single prover to
compute the small exponents. This is because it might be possible for a dishonest participant to
try fixing the decryption share(s) and produce the small exponents, such that the verification is
accepted and the share combining fails. A distributed source of randomness (based on the coin-
flipping protocol) is required as the small exponents are only of length l, where l is small.
The probability of a prover forging his decryption share and fixing the small exponent share is
negligible. This is because the prover is required to commit to the random share first before publish-
ing his decryption share, and the small exponents are produced by hashing the combined random
shares (common reference string) of all the participants. As a collision-resistant hash function is
used to produce the small exponents, a prover can only attempt to forge his decryption share if all
the participants collude.
The rest of the protocol is a Σ-protocol [7], and thus has a special soundness property as
proven in [7]. The proof of soundness for the batching operation has been proven in Section 3.1 and
Section 3.2.
5.3 Error Probability
In any of the three batch verification protocols presented, the probability that a dishonest partici-
pant is discovered is overwhelmingly large as the following:
– As indicated by Theorem 1, the probability that the batch verification equation is satisfied given
incorrect share decryption(s) is 2−l.
– As the prover has to guess the challenge ui at random, the probability that the batch verification
test is accepted where the batch verification equation is not satisfied is 1
q
.
– Therefore, the probability that the batch verification is not accepted given incorrect share
decryption is (1− 2l)(1 − q−1)
As q−1 is very small, e.g: 2−1024, the probability that a dishonest participant being undetected
given incorrect share decryption(s) is approximately 2−l.
6 Efficiency Analysis
Most schemes employing threshold decryption take the decryption process for granted. For example,
in the mixnet scheme by Boneh and Golle [4], they focus on improving the efficiency of correct
mixing operation and only mention the use of threshold decryption. Using our result, the overall
performance of the mixnet scheme can be greatly improved.
We follow Bellare et al. in measuring the cost of our algorithms, where ExpCostm(l) denotes the
time to compute m exponentiations in a common base with different exponents of the same length
l. The computational cost comparison of naive verification against interactive batch verification for
threshold versions of three popular cryptosystems - ElGamal, RSA, and Paillier - is summarised in
Table 1 in terms of the number of modular multiplications required.
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Suppose ExpCost(x) = 1.5x and ExpCosty(x) = y + 0.5xy. Table 1 also illustrates an example
of verifying valid decryption shares from 50 (m = 50) ciphertexts for 10 participants (n = 10,
log2 ∆ ≈ 22), where the length of the integers involved is 1024 bits and the acceptable error is 2
−20
(l = 20). Implemented in the mixnet of Boneh and Golle, our result offers a great reduction of the
computational cost in the threshold decryption phase of the shuffled ciphertexts to be decrypted
in the final phase of mixnet.
Table 1. Performance (number of modular multiplications required) comparison on interactive batch verification
of valid decryption shares for threshold versions of three popular cryptosystems, with 10 participants (decrypting
authorities, n = 10), 50 secret messages to process (m = 50), and 2−20 acceptable error (l = 20).
Naive Batch
ElGamal Each prover m(2ExpCost(log2 q) + 1) ExpCost
m(log2 l)
+2ExpCost(log2 q) + 1
= 153650 = 3623 (97.64% more efficient)
Verifier 2nmExpCost2(log2 q) n(2ExpCost
m(log2 l)
+2ExpCost2(log2 q))
= 1026000 = 31520 (96.93% more efficient)
RSA Each prover m(2ExpCost(log2 M) + 1) ExpCost
m(log2 ∆+ log2 l + 2)
+2ExpCost(log2 M) +m+ 2
= 153650 = 4274 (97.22% more efficient)
Verifier 2nmExpCost2(log2 M) n(2ExpCost
m(log2 ∆+ log2 l + 2)
+2ExpCost2(log2 M))
= 1026000 = 43520 (95.76% more efficient)
Paillier Each prover m(2ExpCost(log2 MN) + 1) ExpCost
m(log2 l + 2)
+2ExpCost(log2 MN) +m+ 1
Verifier 2nmExpCost2(log2 MN) n(2ExpCost
m(log2 l + 2)
+2ExpCost2(log2 MN))
The performance increase in Table 1 is calculated based on the difference of modular multiplica-
tion required in the naive and batch version. According to Table 1, it is estimated that performance
increase when batch verification is employed would be about 97%.
Our results offer better proving and verification performance, while the probability of an in-
valid decryption share being accepted is no more than 2−l. When m increases, the computational
verification cost saved by using our scheme also increases.
7 Conclusion
The SE test by Bellare et al. is originally designed to batch verify modular exponentiations in the
context of signature verification. We modified and extended the scheme to batch verify PEQDL in
the context of threshold decryption.
The scheme presented in this paper greatly improves the efficiency of identifying correct decryp-
tion shares (honest participants) with an overwhelmingly high probability when a large number of
ciphertexts are involved. The bucket test by Bellare et al. (a variant of SE test) can similarly be
modified and extended to achieve better efficiency.
It is quite straight-forward to apply the scheme to batch verify decryption shares in threshold
version of Paillier cryptosystem [9], similar to that of threshold version of RSA. The application is
provided in the appendix.
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Our scheme can easily be implemented in cryptographic applications employing threshold de-
cryption in lowering their computational cost. This offers great performance benefit to various ap-
plications requiring verification of many PEQDLs, such as in secure e-auction or e-voting schemes.
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A Proof of Theorem 2
To prove Theorem 2, we first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2. If ∃k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} ∧ logg y 6= logck ±zk, given a definite set S = {tj |tj < 2
l ∧ j ∈
{1, . . . , k−1, k+1, . . . ,m}}, then there is only at most one tk satisfying logg y = log∏m
j=1 c
tj
j
∏m
j=1 z
tj
j ,
where j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Proof (Lemma 2). If the lemma is incorrect, the following two equations are satisfied simultaneously
where logg y 6= logck ±zk and tk 6= t
′
k.
logg y = log∏m
j=1 c
tj
j
m∏
j=1
z
tj
j
logg y = log
(
∏k−1
j=1 c
tj
j )(c
t′
k
k
)(
∏m
j=k+1 c
tj
j )
(
k−1∏
j=1
z
tj
j )(z
t′k
k )(
m∏
j=k+1
z
tj
j )
As y = gx, we re-write the two previous equations as:
(
m∏
j=1
c
tj
j )
x =
m∏
j=1
z
tj
j
((
k−1∏
j=1
c
tj
j )(c
t′
k
k )(
m∏
j=k+1
c
tj
j ))
x = (
k−1∏
j=1
z
tj
j )(z
t′
k
k )(
m∏
j=k+1
z
tj
j )
Without losing generality, suppose t′k > tk, we can write c
x(t′k−tk)
k = z
t′k−tk
k . Thus, (
cxk
zk
)t
′
k−tk = 1.
Because
cxk
zk
∈ Z∗p, t
′
k − tk is a factor of p − 1 if
cxk
zk
6= 1. As 1 ≤ tk < t
′
k, 0 < t
′
k − tk < q. Hence, if
t′k− tk is a factor of p−1, t
′
k− tk = 2. Therefore,
cxk
zk
= 1∨ (
cxk
zk
)2 = 1. In short
cxk
zk
= ±1, or cxk = ±zk.
This is contradictory to the assumption of logg y 6= logck ±zk. ⊓⊔
Proof (Theorem 2). Lemma 2 means that among the (2l)m possible combinations of tj for j ∈
{1, . . . ,m}, at most (2l)m−1 of them can satisfy logg y = log∏m
j=1 c
tj
j
∏m
j=1 z
tj
j when logg y 6= logcj ±zj .
Therefore, given a random tj for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if logg y 6= logcj ±zj , then logg y = log∏m
j=1 c
tj
j
∏m
j=1 z
tj
j
is accepted with a probability of no more than 2−l. ⊓⊔
B Threshold Paillier
Based on Shoup’s threshold version of RSA signature, Fouque et al. proposed a threshold version of
Paillier cryptosystem [14] in the context of voting or lotteries [12]. The scheme was later improved
by Damg˚ard and Jurik [10] oriented toward a homomorphic e-voting scheme. We recall the protocol
as follows:
1. Key generation and sharing:
Randomly select primes p′ and q′, such that p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ +1 are strong primes, and
GCD(N,φ(N)) = 1, where N = pq and M = p′q′. Select d and e, such that d = 0 modM and
d = e−1 mod N . Choose a random b ∈ Z∗N and set g = (1 + N)
ebN mod N2. Using Shamir’s
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secret sharing scheme, let f(x) =
∑t
r=0 arx
r mod NM , where a0 = d and random values for
the rest of {ar} ∈ {1, . . . , N ∗M − 1}. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, distribute the secret share di = f(i)
to n participants Pi. Select a random v, a square that generates the cyclic group of squares
in Z∗
N2
, to be the verification base. Each participant Pi then computes their corresponding
verification key vi = v
∆di mod N2 and ∆ = n!. The parameters N, g, v and vi are made public,
while M,p, q, p′, q′, d, e and di are kept secret, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
2. Encryption:
Select a random r ∈ Z∗N and encrypt a secret message s as c = g
srN mod N2.
3. Shared decryption:
Each participant Pi computes the decryption share zi = c
2∆di and proves the knowledge of the
secret share di using non-interactive zero-knowledge that:
logv(vi) = logc4(z
2
i ) (5)
Although the verification of the orders of v and c4 is mentioned in [10], in our scheme they are
of orderMN with a large probability (ord (MN)
MN
) as they can be verified to be squares. Therefore
it is a verification of PEQDL in the same group.
4. Shares combining:
Correct decryption share zi of Pi is verified as Pi proves the knowledge of di shown in the previous
step. S is the set of more than t+1 participants providing correct shares. The original message
is reconstructed by computing s = L(c
′)
4∆2 mod N , where c
′ =
∏
i∈S z
2λS
0,i
i mod N
2, and λS0,i =
∆
∏
i′∈S,i′ 6=i
−i
i−i′
∈ Z. The reconstruction is correct as c′ has the form c′ = c4∆
2f(0) = c4∆
2d.
Note that as 4∆2d = 0 mod λ and 4∆2d = 4∆2e−1 mod N , thus c′ = (1 +N)4∆
2s mod N2. As
s is the original message, s can be reconstructed as above.
As in the original scheme [10], v is chosen to be a generator of the group in Z∗
N2
by the
trusted dealer. Therefore, v and vi are squares in the group of Z
∗
N2
. As a result, when verification
of Equation 5 is performed to check the validity of the decryption share, it is guaranteed to be
PEQDL in the same cyclic group with a large probability.
C Batch Verification for Threshold Version of Paillier
Theorem 1 is suitable to batch verify threshold Paillier as:
1. For threshold version of Paillier, G is the cyclic group of all the squares in Z∗
N2
with order
MN = pqp′q′, the smallest factor of which is min(p, q, p′, q′).
2. The value v is trusted to be a generator of squares in Z∗
N2
. As vi is produced using v, and z
2
i,j
are explicitly squared by the verifier, thus vi, zi,j ∈ G (cyclic group of squares in Z
∗
N2
).
3. The value of c4j is a square, and v is trusted to be squares in Z
∗
N2
chosen by the trusted dealer.
Therefore, both c4j , v ∈ G. Thus, c
4
j and v are generators of G with a very large probability
(ord(MN)
MN
).
4. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, ti,j can be chosen randomly while still satisfying ti,j <
2l < min(p, q, p′, q′).
According to Theorem 1, verification of PEQDL in threshold Paillier (Equation 5) can be
batched using SE test as:
logv(vi) = log∏m
j=1(c
4
j )
ti,j (
m∏
j=1
(z2i,j)
ti,j ) (6)
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To verify: logv(vi) = logc4
j
(z2i,j), for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Pi Verifier
ti,j ∈R {1, . . . , 2
l}
ti,j
←−−−−−−−
ri ∈R ZN
γi,1 = v
ri mod N2
γi,2 = (
∏m
j=1(c
4
j)
ti,j )ri mod N2
γi,1,γi,2
−−−−−−−→
ui ∈R [0, A)
ui
←−−−−−−−
wi = ri − uidi
wi
−−−−−−−→
γi,1 = v
wiv
ui
i mod N
2
γi,2 = (
∏m
j=1(c
4
j )
ti,j )wi
(
∏m
j=1(z
2
i,j)
ti,j )ui mod N2
Fig. 5. Batch verification of valid decryption shares for threshold version of Paillier cryptosystem.
Interactive batch verification for threshold version of Paillier is shown in Figure 5. Where A×
ord(G) is much smaller than N , the challenge ui must be chosen in [0, A) such that the shared
secret key di is statistically hidden in the response wi as in [17, 2]. Analysis in [17] suggests the
minimum size of the challenge |A| to be 80 bits, and 128 bits for more secure applications.
Using a hash function and employing the well-known Fiat-Shamir heuristic, the protocol is made
non-interactive. The prover produces the small exponents tj , and challenge ui very similar to the
non-interactive protocol explained in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2.
Unlike in threshold ElGamal, extra verification to ensure that decryption shares passing the
batch verification are not −zi,j is not necessary. This is because decryption shares zi,j are explicitly
squared in the share combining phase to reconstruct the secret message.
